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Abstract
In November 2019 the EU Whistleblower Directive came into force. Whistleblowing has been described as a human right 
and a freedom fundamental to democracy. But it is not always straightforward to understand concrete cases of reporting 
wrongdoing in terms of abstract political philosophy. This paper uses a discussion between Berlin and Skinner about what 
negative freedom is, as a theoretical framework to understand the struggles of a campaigning platform of trade unions and 
civil society organizations, in the coming about of the EU Whistleblower Directive. The paper is empirically based on a 
document analysis of two Resolutions in the European Parliament, the European Commission’s proposal text, the approved 
text in the European Parliament, and messages on the listserv of the campaigning platform between February 2017 and April 
2019. The paper provides insights on how whistleblowing freedom relates to public interest and autonomy.
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Introduction
This paper considers how whistleblowing relates to freedom. 
More precisely, I look at the campaigning between 2016 and 
2019 around the EU Directive on whistleblower protection 
(2019/1937) to understand the fragility of one of human’s 
fundamental freedoms, i.e. freedom of expression.
Note that the formulation in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights sees this freedom not only relating to free-
dom of expressing one’s opinion but also freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information. That is highly relevant for 
this paper, since whistleblowing is the ‘disclosure by organi-
zation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, 
to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action’ 
(Near and Miceli 1985, p. 4). This standard definition of 
whistleblowing (cf Brown et al. 2014) implies that whistle-
blowing involves an intentional disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation to which the whistleblower has insider access.
In business ethics scholarship, much of the research has 
been related to how much autonomy a worker can have with 
regard to her whistleblowing (e.g. Bouville 2008; Hassink 
et al. 2007; Larmer 1992; Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove 
2008; Vandekerckhove and Commers 2003). Is it a duty 
and if so who might impose an obligation to blow the whis-
tle, or is it permissible, i.e. is it up to a worker to decide 
freely? What has received far less attention in business eth-
ics scholarship is the question what justifies prohibiting a 
worker from whistleblowing. That is surprising because it 
is precisely how the battle over the right to ‘receive and 
impart information’—and thus the freedom of expression—
is fought outside of academic scholarship, also in the context 
of whistleblowing. More than two decades ago, Dworkin 
and Callahan (1998) found that increased whistleblower 
protection legislation in the USA was off-set by an increase 
in employers enforcing secrecy agreements against whistle-
blowers through court. In a similar argument, Fasterling and 
Lewis (2014) suggest that whistleblowing on governments 
might lead to governments closing themselves off from the 
media and intensify the prosecution of whistleblowers and 
journalists. It is in that sense that I consider whistleblowing 
legislation as a battleground for freedom. Between obliga-
tion and prohibition, only the position that whistleblowing is 
permissible leaves the autonomy for whistleblowing with the 
worker. In this paper, I focus on how legislation attempts to 
carve out such a ‘zone of non-interference’ for whistleblow-
ing. More precisely, I look at the argumentative dynamic of 
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the documents and campaign culminating in 2019 in the EU 
Whistleblowing Directive (2019/1937).
Elsewhere (Vandekerckhove 2016) I have argued that 
between 1978 and 1999 all legislative bills on whistleblow-
ing anywhere in the world framed whistleblower protection 
as establishing freedom of expression. However, none of 
these were successful. Only when successive bills rephrased 
whistleblowing as an anti-corruption tool was it possible 
to enact whistleblower protection. In countries where the 
debates started after 2000 law proposals skipped the human 
rights/freedom of expression phase and went for an anti-
corruption/anti-fraud rhetoric immediately. Vandekerckhove 
(2016) notes that the anti-corruption rationale for whistle-
blower protection is one of efficiency rather than human 
rights. This changes however around the end of that decade. 
A number of streams combine into a renewed whistleblow-
ing assemblage that (again) uses a freedom of expression 
framing. These streams include (Vandekerckhove 2016): (1) 
growing jurisprudence from the European Court of Human 
Rights on whistleblowing cases brought under Article 10 
(freedom of expression) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights; (2) a mushrooming of leaks sites following 
Wikileaks; (3) the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE), and specifically its Commit-
tee for Legal Affairs and Human Rights, taking up whistle-
blowing in the context of freedom of expression (e.g. PACE 
Resolution 1729 (2010), and PACE Doc.13278 (2013)); (4) 
the 29 principles of the Council of Europe’s Recommenda-
tion (CM/Rec (2014)7) on the protection of whistleblow-
ers, which provide an excellent framework to evaluate any 
national whistleblowing regime around the world, and espe-
cially serves as a benchmark for the Council of Europe’s 47 
member states, which includes the 27 EU Member States.
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have seen 
a boom in whistleblower protection legislation. Globally, 
between 1978 and 1999, only five countries had adopted 
such legislation (Vandekerckhove 2006). Between 2000 
and 2019 at least twenty additional countries have done so. 
The transposition of the EU Whistleblowing Directive into 
the national legislation of the Member States implies that 
27 European countries will either introduce, significantly 
strengthen or at least review their whistleblowing legislation 
(see http://euwhi stleb lowin gmete r.polim eter.org/ for updates 
on the transposition).
Reminiscent of the struggle between whistleblowing and 
secrecy, which Dworkin and Callahan (1998) point at, the 
development of the EU Whistleblowing Directive gained 
momentum after the adoption of the EU Trade Secrets 
Directive in 2016 (2016/943). The next section sketches 
that background. The section after that presents a descrip-
tion of how whistleblowing campaigners pushed forward 
their agenda between 2016 and 2019 and what adversity they 
encountered. Within that section, the paper distinguishes two 
phases, one where debates focused on delineating the public 
interest, and the other starting December 2018, focusing on 
identifying recipients of legitimate whistleblowing.
This paper is not merely descriptive. In the section fol-
lowing the descriptive part, I provide a philosophical discus-
sion of how whistleblowing freedom was fought for. To do 
that I revisit the work of Isaiah Berlin on negative freedom, 
and Quentin Skinner’s critique of that. Berlin was a profes-
sor of social and political theory at Oxford University, and 
is regarded as one of the most important political philoso-
phers of the twentieth century. Skinner is a historian and 
is one of the founders of the Cambridge School of the his-
tory of political thought. I use Berlin and Skinner to discuss 
how the two aspects of the campaign—public interest and 
recipients—relate to freedom and to each other. Berlin and 
Skinner had somewhat different ideas of freedom; I argue 
that the nuance in their thinking helps us to grasp the impor-
tance of considering both aspects together when discussing 
whistleblowing legislation.
EU Trade Secrets Directive
In April 2016, the European Parliament (EP) voted in the 
EU Trade Secrets Directive (2016/943). That was a highly 
contested initiative because it legitimized organizational 
secrecy, not only for its innovations and R&D but also on 
nearly anything the organization could argue was part of 
how it ran its operations. Trade secrets are ‘secret informa-
tion that is of value for its owner because of its secrecy’ 
(Gutfleisch 2018, p. 175). For example, one could argue 
that tax avoidance schemes are trade secrets because that is 
precisely what is underpinning the tax advising company’s 
business.
Gutfleisch (2018) writes that protecting trade secrets is a 
necessary condition for the technological advancement and 
competitiveness of an economy. Hence why the European 
Union crucially needed a trade secrets directive to boost 
R&D and innovations. However, Gutfleisch (2018) points 
out that trade secrets are not the same as intellectual property 
right, like patents, designs or trademarks. Whilst the latter 
are publicly registered, trade secrets are not and hence do not 
grant the trade secret owner an exclusive right. Hence there 
are exceptions to the secrecy of trade secrets. The story of 
the EU Whistleblowing Directive is, as will become clear in 
this paper, one of carving out and safeguarding those excep-
tions to secrecy.
The S&D group within the European Parliament had 
voted in favour of the Trade Secrets Directive, yet in a press 
statement issued on 14 April 2016, the S&D group describes 
itself as a ‘strong negotiator’, having ensured that workers’ 
rights are guaranteed and that whistleblowers and media 
freedom are protected. What were those guarantees?
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The term ‘whistleblowing’ only appears once in the EU 
Trade Secrets Directive, namely in paragraph 20 of the 
explanatory memorandum:
The measures, procedures and remedies provided for in 
this Directive should not restrict whistleblowing activ-
ity. Therefore, the protection of trade secrets should 
not extend to cases in which disclosure of a trade secret 
serves the public interest, insofar as directly relevant 
misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity is revealed. 
(2016/943, para 20)
It is important to note that the Trade Secrets Directive 
refers to freedom of expression and information in the con-
text of investigative journalism (cf. 2016/943, para 19), 
which like whistleblowing, is intended to form limitations 
to the secrecy companies can impose. These limitations are 
specified in Art 5 ‘Exceptions’, which stipulates four condi-
tions that dismiss the imposition of secrecy:
(a) for exercising the right to freedom of expression 
and information as set out in the Charter, including 
respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media;
(b) for revealing misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal 
activity, provided that the respondent acted for the pur-
pose of protecting the general public interest;
(c) disclosure by workers to their representatives as 
part of the legitimate exercise by those representatives 
of their functions in accordance with Union or national 
law, provided that such disclosure was necessary for 
that exercise;
(d) for the purpose of protecting a legitimate interest 
recognised by Union or national law.
(2016/943, Art 5)
It is clear—albeit not explicit—that Art 5 (b) relates to 
whistleblowing, whereas Art 5 (a) relates to freedom of the 
media, and (c) relates trade unions and other forms of worker 
representation. Abazi (2016) writes that Art 5 provides for 
situations where information that meets the definition of a 
trade secret, is nevertheless not considered to be one. Abazi 
(2016) specifically focuses on Art 5 (b), which provides such 
exception in the context of whistleblowing, and asserts that 
the EU Trade Secrets Directive increases the ‘susceptibility 
of whistleblowers despite the exception provide in Art 5, 
let. (b)’ (p. 1071). She gives two reasons for that. The first is 
that the scope of trade secrets leaves too much discretion to 
the company that holds the information, to determine ‘what 
should be disclosed, to whom and when’ (Abazi 2016, p. 
1067). The second reason for the increased ‘susceptibility’ 
of the whistleblower is that the Trade Secrets Directive puts 
the burden of proof on the person claiming the exception 
(i.e. on the whistleblower). The whistleblower needs to prove 
(a) that information pertains to misconduct, wrongdoing or 
illegal activity, and (b) that the disclosure is in the ‘general 
public interest’. Abazi (2016, p. 1069) asks ‘What is pre-
cisely the scope of general public interest’?
Abazi (2016) is of the opinion that the EU Trade Secrets 
Directive does not provide the necessary legal safeguards 
for whistleblower protection. Her assertion that the Direc-
tive increases ‘susceptibility’ of the whistleblower implies 
that it leaves too much discretion with the employer, and not 
enough freedom with the whistleblower. In other words, the 
pertinence of which will become clear in the latter part of 
the paper, the Trade Secrets Directive fails to delineate the 
‘zone of non-interference’ for the whistleblower and thus, 
makes the ‘zone of non-interference’ for the employer far too 
large. Writing in 2016, just after the Trade Secrets Directive 
was voted in and transposition began, Abazi (2016, p. 1069) 
saw the Trade Secrets Directive as merely one side of the 
coin, with a Whistleblowing Directive as the other side of 
that coin: ‘the exception provided in Art 5, let. (b), should 
be read and understood in the broader legal context of (the 
missing) whistleblower protection in EU Member States.’
This paper describes and explains how whistleblowing 
advocates have tried to create a clearly delineated ‘zone of 
non-interference’ for whistleblowers in the context of the EU 
Whistleblowing Directive. It is important to note here that 
Abazi (2016) only mentions the delineation of ‘the general 
public interest’ as the concrete missing piece of the puz-
zle. However, the ‘public interest’ delineation was only one 
fight in the campaign. There was an additional fight, namely 
around who can be legitimate recipients of whistleblower 
disclosures. The next section describes and situates these 
two fights within the campaign by whistleblowing advocates.
Two Fights for Whistleblowing Freedom 
in the EU
This section describes the campaign by whistleblowing 
advocates that has influenced the EU Whistleblowing Direc-
tive (2019/1937). Figure 1 presents a timeline for that cam-
paign and thus, for the ‘coming about’ of the EU Whistle-
blowing Directive.
In October 2016 a campaigning platform is launched by 
Eurocadres, a union for people in management positions, 
together with other unions in Denmark, France, Spain, and 
ETUC. This platform would later expand to include unions 
in other European countries as well as civil society organiza-
tions campaigning for whistleblower protection (e.g. Trans-
parency International, WIN, Blueprint for Free Speech) and 
the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ). I attended that 
inaugural meeting and became part of the email listserv of 
the platform.
In February 2017, the S&D group tabled a ‘Resolu-
tion on the role of whistleblowers in the protection of the 
EU’s financial interests’ (2016/2055(INI)), calling the 
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European Commission (EC) to work on a EU Directive 
on whistleblower protection. In October 2017, it tabled 
another resolution, now ‘on legitimate measures to protect 
whistleblowers acting in the public interest when disclosing 
confidential information of companies and public bodies’ 
(2016/2224(INI)).
The email listserv of the platform became very active in 
January 2018. The EC, more precisely DG JUST was work-
ing on a justification study for the EU Directive and needed 
to be lobbied. That justification study was published in April 
2018, along with a proposal for a Directive. What followed 
was a hectic year of lobbying Commissioners, MEPs, EP 
advisory committees (such as AFCO, EESC, JURI), and 
ministers at national level, launching petitions, open letters 
and holding press conferences. All of this was planned and 
strategized on the listserv. The platform also held meetings 
in Brussels, which were announced on the platform. Since 
many of its members could not attend these meetings, min-
utes of the meetings were also posted on the listserv.
On 15 April 2019, the EP voted-in the EU Directive on 
whistleblower protection with an impressive majority. This 
was an amended version of the proposal the European Com-
mission had tabled a year earlier. The campaigning platform 
believed it had succeeded in significantly improving the 
Directive. The Directive entered into force after publication 
in the Official Journal of the European Union on 26 Novem-
ber 2019, as the ‘Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the 
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law’.
The research for this paper consists of a document analy-
sis of the two resolutions tabled by S&D in 2017, the EC 
proposal text for a Directive of April 2018, the actual voted-
in text of the Directive of April 2019, and listserv emails of 
the campaigning platform between January 2018 and April 
2019. The document analysis focused on the positions lob-
bied for by the campaigning platform and how successful 
these efforts were in establishing freedom in relation to 
whistleblowing in the EU. The two resolutions from 2017 
can be seen as the starting point. The EC proposal from 
April 2018 is the mid-point, and the final EP text of April 
2019 the end-point. The listserv emails contain the debates 
and struggles faced by the campaigning platform.
The listserv data includes 206 posts made between Janu-
ary 2018 and May 2019. The data provides insights into 
the strategies of lobbying and the dynamics of collaboration 
between unions and civil society organizations. It should not 
be surprising that the conversations on the listserv at times 
suggest differences in interests and agendas. However, in 
this paper we focus on two issues the campaigning platform 
fought for: (1) the material scope of ‘public interest’, and (2) 
the three-tiered approach to protected disclosure. I present a 
chronology of that struggle for each of these topics in turn.
Public Interest
Whistleblower protection legislation delineates a ‘material 
scope’ of wrongdoing for which disclosures are protected. 
That scope is typically called ‘public interest’, at least in 
English. Thus disclosures are protected when they are 
deemed to be a ‘public interest disclosure’. This scope has 
tended to be restricted to fraud and corruption (Vandekerck-
hove 2006), and whistleblowing campaigning groups have 
consistently argued for a widening of that scope. In recent 
legislation (e.g. in France, Ireland, Serbia) that has been 
quite successful. In the case of the EU Directive, the scope 
of public interest was also a site of struggle.
The first resolution (February 2017, 2016/2055(INI)), 
had the title ‘on the role of whistleblowers in the protec-
tion of EU’s financial interests’. The term ‘public interest’ 
was mentioned twice. The second resolution (October 2017, 
206/2224(INI)) had the title ‘on legitimate measures to pro-
tect whistleblowers acting in the public interest when dis-
closing confidential information of companies and public 
bodies’. The inclusion of the term ‘public interest’ in the 
title of the resolution is a significant shift, in the sense that 
it makes clear what the agenda is, i.e. this is a call to make 
the whistleblowing a legitimate exception to secrecy. It is 
the public interest that justifies exceptions, and that public 
interest is wider than merely financial interests. It is also 
noteworthy that the word ‘freedom’ is not mentioned in the 
first resolution, but ‘freedom of expression’ is mentioned in 
six different sections of the second resolution. That in itself 
is a departure from the clear separation in the Trade Secrets 
Directive between on the one hand ‘freedom of expression 
Fig. 1  Timeline of the ‘coming 
about’ of the EU Whistleblow-
ing Directive
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and information’ and on the other hand ‘whistleblowing’. 
The two are from now onwards inextricably linked.
Now over to the European Commission’s justification 
study for an EU Directive. One of the considerations the 
European Commission (EC) needs to make in its justifica-
tion relates to the question of subsidiarity. That means that 
there must be a good reason why legislating on an issue 
cannot be left to the Member States. More concretely, the 
EC needs to identify a ‘legal base’, i.e. specific article in 
the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (TFEU) 
on which variation in the Member State legislation would 
undermine the functioning of the European Union. The justi-
fication study published in April 2018 includes a cost/benefit 
analysis for four options: (1) status quo, (2) a Commission 
Recommendation (non-binding), (3) a Directive on whistle-
blower protection in the area of financial interests of the EU, 
and (4) a Directive on whistleblower protection in certain 
areas of EU Law. The justification study opts for option 4, 
i.e. the broadest one in material scope.
More precisely, the EC proposal for a Directive sets out as 
material scope: personal data (Art 16 TFEU), customs coop-
eration (Art 33 TFEU), agricultural policy (Art 43 TFEU), 
freedom of establishment (Art 50 TFEU), recognition of 
diplomas and other formal qualifications (Art 53(1) TFEU), 
transport policy and safety (Art 91 TFEU), transport by rail, 
road, and inland waterway (Art 100 TFEU), State aid (Art 
109 TFEU), internal market (Art 114 TFEU), health (Art 
168 TFEU), consumer protection (Art 169 TFEU), tariff (Art 
207 TFEU), combatting fraud (Art 325 TFEU). That means 
that disclosures about wrongdoing relating to any of these 
could be regarded as ‘public interest’ and thus protected 
disclosures.
In May 2018, the platform prepares its first shot at the 
EC proposal. The coordinating union puts forward a plat-
form text that says that the EC proposal is ambitious but 
that loopholes need to be closed and that protection of work-
ers and journalists needs to be strengthened. Other unions 
on the platform disagree with the overall positive tone and 
request a broadening of the material scope. The platform 
quickly reaches consensus on getting Art 153 TFEU into 
the material scope. Article 153 covers working conditions, 
social security and social protection of workers. Hence, from 
a union side there is the push to get workers’ rights acknowl-
edged as public interest. From the side of civil society 
organizations, an open letter states that the material scope 
must include human rights violations, gross waste and gross 
mismanagement. The open letter refers to ‘best practices for 
whistleblower laws’.
Meanwhile the platform is gearing up its lobbying 
activities. In June 2018 the platform is informed of a 
meeting between members of the platform and the EP 
rapporteur, who is taking up a number of requests, but 
no mention is made about material scope. In September 
2018 the platform is informed that employer demands at 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), an 
advisory assembly composed of social partners (employer 
organizations, trade unions, and representative of other 
interests), were voted down. These demands would have 
narrowed down the scope, and the platform takes credit 
for having stopped that. In October 2018 the platform is 
informed that the EP’s constitutional affairs committee 
(AFCO) takes the opinion that there cannot be a change to 
the legal basis of the Directive. Hence, the EP’s committee 
on legal affairs (JURI) will be crucial. However, their vote 
has been postponed. The platform is also informed that 
usually JURI follows the EP proposal but this time there 
might be an exception: the person providing legal services 
opinion is Axel Voss (EPP, Germany) who has so far not 
been favourable to the campaign. There remains however 
a belief amongst platform members that JURI will be open 
to the possibility of including Art 153 TFEU. A couple of 
days later JURI indeed forms the opinion that Art 153 is 
compatible. A week after that the EESC opinion is also 
that Art 153 must be considered.
Hence the campaign is gaining momentum. The post-
poned JURI vote takes place on 20 November 2018. JURI 
takes on the amendment to expand the material scope, 
which now also includes: ‘employment, working condi-
tions, workers’ rights on the principle of equal opportu-
nities and treatment between men and women’. On the 
platform, this news goes out with the title ‘Win in EP!’, 
and is seen as a good start for the ‘trilogues’.
The trilogues consist of a sequence of substantial and 
technical meetings between the European Parliament, the 
European Commission and the European Council. This 
is where decisions and text are fine-tuned and polished 
before heading back to the European Parliament to be 
voted on. In December 2018, the platform is informed of 
the news that the Council is not in favour of the broad 
range for the legal basis of the Directive. More precisely, 
the Council will not want to include Art 153 TFEU with-
out consulting social partners, and there is no time for that 
now. Given that the EU elections are scheduled for May 
2019, an additional consultation round would endanger 
the whole Directive project. The platform puts its hopes 
on including Art 153 TFEU in a review of the Directive 
in 6 years’ time. The resulting material scope for whistle-
blower protection in the EU Directive is left at: protection 
of personal data, agriculture, freedom of establishment, 
recognition of diplomas and other formal qualifications, 
transport, rail road and inland waterway, internal market, 
public health, consumer interest, environment and fraud. 




From December 2018 onwards—after the defeat on public 
interest—the platform focusses its lobbying activities on 
the mandatory three-tiered sequence of the EC proposal. 
This mandatory sequence implies that for whistleblowers to 
be protected against retaliation, they need to first report the 
wrongdoing inside the employer organisation, before going 
outside to a regulator, and they could only disclose to the 
media after they have reported internally and to a regula-
tor. Before describing how the campaign platform fought 
on this particular topic, it is necessary to discuss the idea 
more generally.
The distinction needs to be made between on the one 
hand a descriptive account of how whistleblowing escalates 
and on the other hand a prescriptive account of which steps 
must be taken in the escalation process for the whistleblow-
ing to be legitimate. The descriptive account is most uni-
vocal: whistleblowing typically is a gradual escalation of 
reporting wrongdoing from internal to regulator to a public 
disclosure. The pattern is consistent across different policy 
models. Donkin et al. (2008) show that gradual escalation is 
a typical pattern for whistleblowing in the Australian public 
sector. Vandekerckhove and Phillips (2019) demonstrate the 
same for whistleblowers from across different sectors in the 
UK. Austin and Lombard (2019, p. 82), referring to the SEC 
annual report of 2017, write that even in jurisdictions with 
a whistleblower bounty programme, the ‘evidence indicates 
that most whistle-blowers first report internally.’
Prescriptively speaking, there are different approaches. I 
will demonstrate this multivocality by briefly commenting 
on three approaches: the US, the UK, and France. In the 
US, the Dodd-Frank Act provides awards and protection to 
whistleblowers who report fraud to the SEC. It is important 
to note—without going into too much detail here—that dif-
ferent law applies to financial award for and protection of 
whistleblowers, even if both fall within the larger statute of 
Dodd Frank. Awards are intended to incentivize whistle-
blowers to come forward, whereas protection programs are 
intended to provide the whistleblowers with legal remedies 
as victims of retaliation. The Dodd-Frank legislation itself 
does not require whistleblowers to have reported internally 
first. However, the SEC rules do incentivise internal whistle-
blowing (SEC 2011, p. 231). In deciding what amount 
the whistleblower will get for their information, the SEC 
considers favourably when a whistleblower first internally 
reported the fraud (Austin and Lombard 2019). The ration-
ale is that because the regulator runs an award program for 
whistleblowers, companies are incentivised to enhance their 
internal compliance and whistleblowing mechanisms so that 
the company receives early notification from their workers 
(Austin and Lombard 2019). Thus, initially the US Dodd-
Frank model incentivized internal reporting without making 
it mandatory. That was different for the so-called ‘gatekeeper 
professions’, i.e. professions who can disrupt wrongdoing by 
withdrawing their cooperation with the company where the 
wrongdoing occurs, such as auditors, certified accountants, 
lawyers, etc. (Gutter 2010). The SEC initially refrained from 
awarding money to gatekeeper whistleblowers, unless they 
had blown the whistle 120 days earlier to the board of the 
company. Recently, the Supreme Court in Dig Realty Trust 
vs Somers (138 S. Ct. 767(2018)), relied on a ‘plain read-
ing’ of the Dodd-Frank Act to hold that protection does not 
extend for internal whistleblowers but extends only to those 
who report a securities law violation to the SEC’ (Heyman 
2019). In September 2020, this case led to the SEC rewrit-
ing rule 21F-2(d)(4) to now clearly instruct whistleblowers 
to directly report to the SEC if they want protection and 
financial award (NLR 2020).
The UK Public Interest Disclosure Act does not have a 
bounty program like the Dodd-Frank Act has. It is imple-
mented through employment law, and is sometimes said to 
have two levels of disclosure: to the employer or the regula-
tor in the first instance, and to the wider public as a second 
level (Bowers et al. 1999). Initially, protection for first level 
disclosures required the whistleblower to have reported in 
good faith (Bowers et al. 1999). Second level disclosures, i.e. 
to the wider public were protected if the worker reasonably 
believed she would have been victimised, there would have 
been a cover-up, or the employer or regulator had failed to 
act on a previous report by the whistleblower. This sounds 
like a pretty relaxed regime. However, whistleblowers had a 
hard time at Employment Tribunal to convince the judge of 
their good faith when they had gone straight to the regulator. 
In 2013, the good faith test was taken out and replaced by 
a requirement that the worker had a reasonable belief their 
whistleblowing was in the public interest, and that it was 
reasonable for them to blow the whistle to whom they did. 
Thus, PIDA remains difficult to predict; it protects those 
whistleblowers of whom the judge finds that they acted rea-
sonably. The approach in France is more rigid. The Sapin II 
law provided protection for whistleblowers only when they 
follow a mandatory sequence: internal, to a regulator, wider 
disclosures.
What about the EU Whistleblowing Directive? In its justi-
fication study, which underlies the EC proposal directive, the 
EC refers explicitly to Vandekerckhove’s (2010) articulation. 
This approach stipulates that regulators need to be mandated 
to receive reports from whistleblowers in order to intervene 
when organizations they regulate are not able or not willing 
to stop wrongdoing that occurs under their responsibility. 
However, whistleblower reports to regulators are not pub-
lic disclosures; regulators act on the publics behalf. Public 
disclosures (e.g. to journalists) also need to be protected so 
that whistleblowers could warn the public of malfunctioning 
regulators. Vandekerckhove (2006, 2010) aimed to articulate 
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the logic of good governance that implicitly underlies policy 
models found in the early 1990s in Australia (Queensland 
and New South Wales), but also the UK. It seems that the 
EC proposal text interpreted Vandekerckhove’s three-tiered 
model through a French lens, as rigidly prescriptive. It thus 
stipulated that whistleblowers would be obliged to blow the 
whistle inside their organization first before going elsewhere.
The campaigning platform fought this mandatory internal 
reporting stipulation. This is where civil society organiza-
tions got the upper hand within the platform. Before 2018 
unions held the view that the mandatory tiered sequence 
provisions were not the main problem—the material scope 
was—and that some rewording of exception to the obliga-
tion to go internally first would suffice. WIN had first tabled 
concerns about the mandatory tiered sequence in June 2018. 
From then on, both material scope and tiered sequence were 
campaigning positions. In October 2018 WIN provides the 
platform with a couple of one-pagers, basically argumenta-
tive ammunition against a mandatory tiered sequence. The 
brief states that.
mandatory internal reporting would undermine the 
Directive’s goal by increasing the opportunities for 
retaliation and enabling obstruction of justice. It would 
be contrary to many established justice systems for a 
whistleblower to lack the certainty that they are able to 
turn to competent authorities without reprisal. (WIN 
brief 181017)
WIN had produced these briefs in August 2018, but 
only now starts to promote these through the platform. As 
with the material scope issue around this time, EP commit-
tees seem prepared to move away from mandatory internal 
reporting, and so does AFCO.
As already noted, in December the route to a wider mate-
rial scope is closed off, and the platform now fully takes 
up the attack on the mandatory tiered sequence. In Janu-
ary 2019 the platform is briefed on how Member States 
representatives stand with regard to the mandatory tiered 
sequence. Apparently Germany and France want to keep 
it. Moreover, the Council text, which forms the bases for 
the trilogues also keeps the mandatory tiered sequence. In 
response, Eurocadres and other unions plan to increase pres-
sure by launching a public petition. Early February 2019, 
Tom Devine from GAP issues a text to the platform on ‘poi-
son pills’ and ‘cardboard shields’ in whistleblower protec-
tion. His analysis includes the following:
Mandatory internal reports in any form enable 
obstruction of justice at bad faith organizations, 
because they lock in a three month grace period to 
perfect a cover-up. While the proposal has a rele-
vant exception, there is an inherent chilling effect 
from barring the clear, free choice of audience. Until 
the whole case is over, employees would not know 
whether they waived their rights by going straight to 
authorities. This is highly uncertain. As the recital 
explains, at 23, whether the exception applies “will 
thus depend on the circumstances of each case and 
of the nature of the rules that have been breached.”
A week later, the platform publishes an open letter on 
the mandatory tiered sequence, using Devine’s imagery of 
the shield (see Fig. 2). The platform also issues a call on 
members to lobby ministers at national level, in particular 
ministers of justice. Meanwhile, Blueprint for Free Speech 
launches a parallel public petition, which is not taken all 
that well by the unions, who call for unity.
At the end of February 2019, the platform signals 
that there might be a blocking minority in the Council: 
10 Member States now oppose the mandatory tiered 
sequence; Germany and France still want it. At the begin-
ning of March, positions in the Council seem entrenched 
but the petitions together gathered 250,000 signatories. A 
couple of days later, Eurocadres reports some opening at 
COREPER (the committee of permanent Member State 
representatives) in the Council. On 11 March the platform 
informs that there is a ‘breakthrough’ on tiered sequence 
in the trilogues. Germany and France have caved in. The 
text can now be amended and sent to the EP for voting.
On 15 April there is a huge wave of celebrating mes-
sages and mutual congratulations on the listserv after the 
successful vote in the EP. Four days before this, Julian 
Assange was arrested in London.
Fig. 2  Image issued by the platform with the open letter February 




Discussion: Is It Freedom?
Let’s recap. The ‘coming about’ of the EU Whistleblow-
ing Directive starts with the voting in of the EU Trade 
Secrets Directive. Hence, we start from secrecy and too 
much employer discretion to impose secrecy, which needs 
to be pushed back by clarifying what the public interest 
is (Abazi 2016). In other words, The Trade Secrets Direc-
tive created too much legitimate interference with freedom 
of expression and information, and the Whistleblowing 
Directive needs to carve out a ‘zone of non-interference’. 
I have described the activities and struggles of a cam-
paigning platform to carve out such a zone of freedom. 
I have described how the unions took the lead in fighting 
for a delineation of ‘public interest’ and the whistleblow-
ing activist staged a fight over the mandatory sequence of 
reporting wrongdoing. In this section I will use the work 
of Berlin and Skinner to situate these two fights with 
regard to freedom.
Before I do that, it is interesting to look at the use of 
the word ‘freedom’ in the documents en route to the EU 
Whistleblowing Directive. The Trade Secrets Directive—
the start of that route—made a clear separation between 
freedom of expression (Art 5a of 2016/943) and public 
interest disclosures (Art. 5b of 2016/943). The EC justifi-
cation study states that (p. 32) the general objective is to 
address underreporting of breaches of EU law, and that 
this will ‘in turn have ancillary benefits’ such as protection 
of fundamental rights, and in that sense enhance freedom 
of expression. The protections it offers to whistleblowers 
are based on the principles provided in the ECtHR case 
law on freedom of expression (ECHR Art 10). In the EC 
proposal text of April 2018, the word ‘freedom’ occurs 23 
times in the following combinations: freedom of expres-
sion, media freedom, freedom to conduct a business, free-
doms of others. Very often ‘freedom of expression’ and 
‘media freedom’ are used together as one expression. In 
the adopted text of the Directive (April 2019), the word 
‘freedom’ occurs 17 times in the following combinations: 
freedom of expression, media freedom, free movement of 
goods, freedom to provide services, freedoms of others, 
freedom to conduct a business. The terms ‘freedom of 
expression’ and ‘media freedoms’ are less often part of 
the same expression.
Whilst this is interesting, it does not really answer the 
question philosophically. There has been a clear attempt 
to make the link between freedom of expression and infor-
mation on the one hand and whistleblowing on the other, 
but the end result does not seem particularly strong. But 
that is when we look at word frequency. However, in the 
two subsections that follow now, I use Berlin and Skinner 
to make clear in what way the link between freedom and 
whistleblowing has gained deep ties in the EU Whistle-
blowing Directive. Perhaps not in word count but defi-
nitely in public interest and autonomy.
The Zone of Public Interest
Berlin writes that it is the absence of deliberate interference 
by others which is essential to freedom. Thus freedom is a 
negative notion and is ‘a situation in which others do not 
interfere with my actions’ (Berlin 2014, p. 183). Hence, ‘the 
wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom’ 
(ibid.). Berlin readily acknowledges that this line of thinking 
is Hobbesian, and that consequentialist philosophers debate 
over how wide or narrow that ‘area of non-interference’ 
should be—Berlin mentions Bentham and Mill but we could 
argue that much of political philosophy is a continuation of 
such ‘haggling’ (Berlin 2014, p. 184). However, they do not 
disagree that freedom is limited somewhere. In a Hobbesian 
argument, we accept a limit to our freedom because we know 
that all others have their freedom limited in the same way. In 
that sense our freedom does not depend on our power; Berlin 
writes that the ‘liberty of the weak depends on restraint of 
the strong’ (Berlin 2014, p. 185).
Indeed, that is where we started: the Trade Secrets 
Directive leaves the employer unrestrained; freedom of 
the whistleblower can be attained by delineating a zone of 
non-interference. I submit here that the fight over the mate-
rial scope of the EU Directive was an instance of disagree-
ment about how wide the area of non-interference should 
be. Whistleblower legislation puts in place an area where 
people who disclose information about wrongdoing cannot 
be interfered with. The material scope of whistleblowing 
legislation carves out the type of wrongdoing about which 
disclosures must not be interfered with. Thus, the fight over 
how broad the material scope should be, is a fight over how 
wide the area of non-interference should be.
How exactly was this fight staged? In May 2018, the 
campaigning platform reached the position, quite soon after 
the EC published its proposal text, that Article 153 TFEU 
should be included in the legal base of the EU Directive. 
This would widen the material scope to also include dis-
closures about wrongdoing related to working conditions 
and social protection of workers. That would have amounted 
to an important widening, especially considering the trade 
secrets background of the EU Whistleblowing Directive and 
the coming together of unions and whistleblower activists.
Meanwhile, civil society voices were also chipping in. 
WIN’s open letter in June 2018 argues that the material 
scope should include human rights violations. The letter 
also includes a fascinating passage on freedom, namely that 
whistleblower protection is about freedom of expression, 
which is necessary to hold powers accountable. Hence, in 
Berlin’s lingo, WIN is arguing that whistleblower protection 
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is about creating an area of non-interference for people to 
interfere when others harm society. Does Berlin talk about 
that? Very much so. It is at the core of the notion of negative 
freedom. As Skinner points out, Berlin’s core is Hobbesian: 
we obey limitations to our freedom because the others face 
the same limitations. Or, if everyone can blow the whistle on 
someone else, then the powerful will not be able to get away 
with harming others. The freedom of the powerful is limited 
by the freedom to blow the whistle on them. That is WIN’s 
argument in the claim that freedom of expression holds those 
in power accountable. It is also what the unions call for when 
they want Article 153 FTEU to be part of the material scope, 
albeit in a more institutionalized phrasing. If disclosures of 
wrongdoing related to worker’s rights are within the area of 
non-interference, unions will have more power to do what 
they do, i.e. block capital’s interference with labour. How-
ever, the fight for including Article 153 FTEU in the material 
scope of the EU Directive was not successful. It nevertheless 
was a fight over widening the area of freedom.
What to say about the use of the term ‘public interest’? In 
the 26 month trajectory between the first resolution in Febru-
ary 2017 to the voted-in text of the Directive in April 2019, 
it is the second resolution from October 2017 that peaks in 
the use of term ‘public interest’. The debate then moves on 
using concrete legislative articles (e.g. Art 153 TFEU). Talk 
of a ‘public interest’ remains vague, and the evolution from 
Resolution to EU Directive can be seen as one of making the 
delineation of the area of freedom less vague.
But that is not all. So far, in discussing the ‘zone of non-
interference’ for whistleblowing in the EU Whistleblow-
ing Directive, I have looked at the fight over the ‘zone’, i.e. 
Abazi’s (2016) question ‘what is the public interest?’. The 
remaining question relates to what can be understood by 
‘non-interference’. In the context of whistleblowing, interfer-
ence is retaliation. Retaliation against whistleblowers, what-
ever form it might take, are attempts to silence people or to 
kick them out of their professional recognition and standing 
(Kenny 2019; Weiskopf and Tobias-Miersch 2016). There 
was not particularly a big fight over this in the coming about 
of the EU Whistleblowing Directive, but it is worth mention-
ing that in the directive, retaliation is defined as.
any direct or indirect act or omission which occurs in a 
work-related context, is prompted by internal or exter-
nal reporting or by public disclosure, and which causes 
or may cause unjustified detriment to the reporting per-
son; (2019/1937, Art 5. 11)
Measures for protection against retaliation and for sup-
port of the whistleblower (Chapter VI of 2019/1937) are 
wide, include not only actual behaviours and omissions 
but also threats, and also apply to third persons associated 
with whistleblowers. It would be out of scope for this paper, 
I believe, to discuss each of these, especially since I am 
focusing in this paper on what appeared to be the big fights. 
It is however important to point out that ‘interference’ can 
also be disinformation. To that end, the EU Whistleblow-
ing Directive obliges all organisations with more than 50 
employees to have internal whistleblowing policies and con-
fidential channels for reporting (Art. 8 and 9 of 2019/1937). 
But again, there wasn’t really a fight over any of this.
But what about the mandatory tiered sequence? I wrote 
that this was the second big fight besides the material scope. 
That is something where I believe Quentin Skinner’s take on 
Berlin’s delineation of negative freedom can give us some 
insight into how important that point really was. I do that 
next.
Mandatory Sequence and Autonomy
In his Isaiah Berlin Lecture at the British Academy in 2001, 
Skinner argues that by echoing Hobbes, Berlin discredits a 
formulation of negative liberty that was used by the early 
seventeenth century revolutionaries promoting ‘the cause of 
Parliament against the crown and to legitimize the execution 
of King Charles I’ (Skinner 2002, p. 247). Thus, Skinner 
casts Hobbes as a counter-revolutionary. He then draws a 
lineage from Hobbes notion of negative liberty (which Ber-
lin echoes) to the rise of utilitarianism and its hegemony in 
the ‘conceptual space’ of liberty.
Skinner wants to ‘lift back to the surface’ this alternative 
notion, which I believe is pertinent for the whistleblowing 
campaign in the EU. What is that notion? It is the position 
that equals living a life in dependence of the power of some-
one else to living in a state of servitude, and further equals 
living in servitude to a lack of freedom. Skinner derives 
this position from the writings of the 17th Century Parlia-
mentarians who were critics of the royal prerogative. He 
also locates it in Roman political thought. Thus, freedom 
is ‘restricted not only by actual interference or the threat 
of it, but also by the mere knowledge that we are living in 
dependence on the goodwill of others’ (Skinner 2002, p. 
247). It is not the possibility of such arbitrary interference 
but the awareness of living under arbitrary power that makes 
us unfree. 
Berlin distinguishes his two concepts of liberty on the 
source of what limits freedom. In negative freedom the 
source of limit to my freedom are the others; in positive 
freedom I am my own source of limits to my freedom but 
that coincides with what I want. The remainder of Berlin’s 
paper is mainly spent on arguing what freedom is not. For 
example, equality and justice are just as important goals, 
Berlin notes, but they are not the same as freedom. Berlin 
also makes the point that in evaluating freedom as good, we 
must not confound it with other notions we regard as good.
The difference is more than a semantic detail. Now, Skin-
ner’s notion is not Berlin’s positive freedom because I do not 
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want my state of servitude. Nevertheless, it is my awareness 
of my dependence that makes me act differently to how I 
want to. One might argue that in Skinner’s notion of nega-
tive freedom I am the source of my unfreedom albeit that 
my unfreedom is self-censorship rather than self-mastery. 
So there are two notions of negative liberty: where Berlin 
insists that freedom is limited by coercion, Skinner claims 
that it can also be limited by servitude.
Back to the EU Whistleblowing Directive and the 
campaign. At first sight, the struggle over the mandatory 
sequence of recipients does not seem to be over a widening 
of the area of non-interference. The three tiers were there 
from the start, and are still there. What was removed is the 
mandatory sequencing in order for the whistleblower to find 
protection. Hence, is this about freedom, about security or 
about autonomy?
From a legal perspective, the approved text (no man-
datory sequence) does not provide more security in terms 
of predictability. There is a bit of a paradox here. One the 
one hand, if one follows the mandatory steps one is more 
likely to know that protection will be granted than cur-
rently, when one will need to argue proportionality and rea-
sonable belief. On the other hand, following a mandatory 
sequence can make the whistleblower prone to arbitrariness 
and interference of the employer or the regulator. It would 
have put us back to Abazi’s (2016) comment that too much 
discretion is left to the employer to decide what needs to be 
secret for whom. And that was precisely what was wrong 
(or incomplete) with regard to the Trade Secrets Directive. 
Thus, restraining that discretion—carving out the zone of 
non-interference—is not done only through delineating the 
‘zone’ but also through delineating ‘non-interference’.
From a sociological and psychological perspective, there is 
a strong case to argue that this struggle was about autonomy. 
The whistleblower takes power by speaking up, but loses that 
power when they are neglected, when they need to wait for 
3 months before being able to take it further (Kenny 2019; 
Kenny et al. 2018). The platform argued that it needed to be 
for the whistleblower to decide, that it had to be left in their 
hands. Hence, if the whistleblower takes up power to speak 
up, they need to maintain their autonomy. The civil society 
organizations on this campaigning platform cast that autonomy 
as a freedom of expression to hold others to account. The con-
ceptual linking of autonomy and freedom found in this paper 
is similar to the one Skinner mentions. This is about not being 
dependent on someone else whose power is based on the dis-
cretion they have over people’s decisions. Perhaps the strug-
gle studied in this paper is an even better example than Skin-
ner’s. Devine pointed out in his analysis that what he called 
‘poison pills’ (i.e. instances of discretion over the legitimacy 
of whistleblowers’ decisions) in the Council text would lead 
to law suits against whistleblowers. There can be little doubt 
that being taken to court as an individual by a resource rich 
organization (at least comparatively speaking) is ‘interference 
by others’. Thus, in the context of whistleblowing, fighting for 
autonomy is fighting for freedom.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have described how the coming about of the 
EU Directive on whistleblower protection was a making-more-
secure of the freedom hinted at in the EU Trade Secrets Direc-
tive. In making that freedom more secure, it was necessary to 
fight for specific delineations of a ‘zone of non-interference’ 
for whistleblowing. I described how a campaigning platform 
of unions and whistleblowing activists fought on two main 
fronts: delineating the material scope for the EU Whistleblow-
ing Directive as the ‘zone’ of what counts as the public inter-
est, and making an important change with regard to ‘non-inter-
ference’ compared to the EC proposal, namely getting rid of 
the mandatory sequence for escalating whistleblowing reports. 
Looking back at the EU Trade Secrets Directive, the fight over 
the mandatory sequence might have seemed like a detail. Yet, 
it is an important element for whistleblowing freedom. I used 
Berlin and Skinner to make clear just how important.
Berlin argues that security and autonomy are not freedom; 
Skinner argues that insecure freedom is dependency and thus 
slavery. Skinner’s historical example is one in which arbitrari-
ness in overruling someone’s decision is a lack of autonomy. 
That is the opposite of freedom because being at someone 
else’s discretion is not being free. I have argued that, in its 
fight to get rid of the mandatory sequence, the whistleblowing 
campaign is a contemporary example of what Skinner points 
at, namely that it does not make sense to talk about freedom 
without autonomy. In whistleblowing, freedom of information 
is crucial and implies the whistleblower has the right to impart 
information. This right not only extends to information in the 
public interest but also implies that the whistleblower main-
tains autonomy in the choice of who receives the information.
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